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CRIMINAL LAW NEWSLErrER

The Ins and Outs, Stops and Starts of
Speedy Trial Rights in Colorado-Part II
by Patrick Furman

This column issponsored by the
CBA Criminal Law Section. It features articles written by prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges to
provide information about case law,
legislation, and advocacy affecting
the prosecution, defense, and administration of criminal cases in
Colorado state and federal courts.

This two-part article reviews the constitutional and
statutory right to a speedy trial and discusses the case
law interpretingthat right. The first part was printed
in July 2002.

dressed the constitutional right to
I of this
article
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trialtwo-part
and provided
a preliminary discussion of the statutory right
to a speedy trial.' Part II discusses various issues that arise under Colorado's
speedy trial statute, including: (1) delays
caused by appellate proceedings; (2) interactions between the right to a speedy
trial and the right to the effective assistance of counsel; and (3) delays that are
attributable to actions by the prosecution
or the court.
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If a defendant's conviction at trial is reversed on appeal, any new trial must
commence within six months of the date
the trial court receives the mandate from
the appellate court.2 This rule does not
apply to a3 conviction resulting from a plea
of guilty.
If an interlocutory appeal is taken in
a case, the period of delay caused by the
appeal is not included in calculating the
statutory speedy trial period, regardless
of whether the interlocutory appeal is
commenced by the defendant or the prosecution,4 and regardless of whether the
appeal is procedurally flawed or denied
by the appellate court.5 The delay caused
by the appeal and a reasonable amount
of time for resetting the matter for trial
following remand to the trial court are
excluded from the speedy trial calculation.6 Similarly, any delay caused by an
original proceeding pursuant to C.A.R.
7
21 tolls the speedy trial statute.

The breadth of this exclusion of time
spent on interlocutory appeals is not
without limit. An interlocutory appeal
must: (1) have been taken in good faith;
(2) have arguable merit; (3) not have been
taken for the purposes of delay; and (4)
have raised issues that substantially impacted the prosecution's case.8
In People v. Witty,9 the defendant successfully moved to recuse the District Attorney's Office on the ground that the
charges against him involved an allegation that he defrauded a pension fund
that covered employees in the prosecutor's office. The prosecution took an appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals,
which was denied on the ground that no
final judgment had entered in the case.
The defendant subsequently entered a
guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal
the speedy trial issue because far more
than six months had passed since he entered his plea of not guilty.
The Court of Appeals addressed the
speedy trial issue this time, and held that
the speedy trial statute had been violated, finding that the appeals were not interlocutory for purposes of the statute.
An order disqualifying a prosecutor may
cause a minor delay while a new prosecutor is appointed; such an order "has no
substantial effect on the prosecution's
case for purposes of determining whether appeal of that order is an interlocutory appeal." 10 The court went on to add
that "a defendant.., should not have his
or her period of incarceration extended
while the government sorts out who
should prosecute."" The defendant's
guilty plea was vacated and the Witty
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The determination of whether the con- whose schedule did not allow him to try
tinuance necessitated by the substitution the case before a speedy trial deadlineof counsel is properly chargeable to the de- was not properly chargeable to the defenfendant must be made on a case-by-case dant. The Court ordered the trial court to
basis. 16 If the delay is created by a substi- bring the defendant to trial within the two
tution of defense counsel caused by the de- months remaining before the expiration
fendant's unwillingness to cooperate with of the statutory speedy trial deadline. The
his or her original counsel, the resulting Court made it clear that the trial court had
delay may be attributable to the defen- not made the appropriate effort to find
dant. This rule applies even if the defen- counsel who could try the case within the
dant objects to the substitution of counsel speedy trial framework.
Both the determination of whether to
and to the continuance needed 17to enable
allow counsel to withdraw and the grantnew counsel to prepare for trial.
A continuance due to defense counsel's ing of a continuance are left to the sound
unavailability to try a case within the stat- discretion of the trial court. These issues
utory speedy trial period may be charge- will not be reversed on appeal absent an
24
able to the defendant, thus extending the abuse of discretion.
8
statutory speedy trial deadline.' Even in
the absence of a showing that defense Delays Attributable to
Speedy Trial and the Right
counsel was unavailable, delays in schedTo Effective Assistance of
uling a trial to accommodate defense coun- Prosecution or Court
Counsel
Continuances at the request of the prossel have been attributable to the defendant
Another issue that recurs with some fre- in determining whether the speedy trial ecution, without the consent of the defendant, generally do not extend the period of
quency is the tension that arises between statute has been violated. 9
the right to a speedy trial and the right to
The constitutional right to counsel im- speedy trial. However, there is one instance
the effective assistance of counsel. The pacts these situations regardless of the in which the statutory right to a speedy
right to counsel is as important and fun- applicability of the statute. The Colorado trial can be extended by the prosecutions
damental as the right to a speedy and pub- Court of Appeals has held that the protec- motion to continue, even over a defendant's
lic trial. For a variety of reasons, counsel tion of certain constitutional rights justi- objection. CRS § 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) allows
up to six additional months to be added to
may not be prepared to proceed to trial, or
fies a delay in trying a criminal case. That
the speedy trial time if the prosecution esmay not be able to continue to represent
court has approved an extension ofthe sixtablishes the following three factors: (1)
the defendant. If these problems necessimonth speedy trial time period to protect
evidence that is material to the state's case
tate a continuance or the hiring or appointthe constitutional right to counsel when is unavailable; (2) the prosecution has exment of new counsel, speedy trial probdefense counsel was unprepared to pro- ercised due diligence to obtain such evilems may arise, particularly when the efceed on the trial date through no fault of dence; and (3) reasonable grounds exist to
fective assistance issue arises at, or near,
20
the defendant.
believe that the evidence will be available
the time of trial.
If defense counsel has caused a delay in at a later date.
In general, unless a criminal defendant
Extensions of the speedy trial time unis brought to trial within six months of the the proceedings by failing to file motions
date he or she enters a plea of not guilty, in a timely fashion, that period of delay der CRS § 18-1-405(6)(g)(I) have been apcharges against the defendant must be may well be attributable to the defendant proved when the prosecution: (1) needed
and toll the speedy trial statute. The Col- time to complete the trial ofa co-defendant
dismissed.14 If the defendant validly waives
the right to a speedy trial to resolve the orado Supreme Court applied this princi- and make the co-defendant available to
effective assistance issue, the statutory ple when defense counsel made an oral testify;25 (2) demonstrated both due dilispeedy trial issue is resolved by that waiv- motion to dismiss on joinder grounds on gence in obtaining the victim's presence at
er. However, if the defendant refuses to the morning of trial, and the court and trial and the availability of the victim at a
time to research and later date;26(3) demonstrated due diligence
waive the right to speedy trial, the issue prosecution needed
resolve the issue. 2' However, it is not ap- by issuing regular subpoenas and making
becomes more complicated.
If the defendant requests a continuance, propriate to toll the statute and continue lodging arrangements for out-of-state witthe basic rule that six months is added to the case when defense counsel does not nesses, in the good faith belief that the witthe statutory speedy trial period may be file a notice of defense or list of witnesses nesses would continue to cooperate; 27 or
applicable. If the need for a substitution of when the defense is general denial and (4) thought, in good faith, that an essendoes not intend to call any tial witness would have given birth and
counsel is properly chargeable to the the defendant
22
would be available by the trial date.'
defendant, and counsel must have a con- witnesses.
In all of these situations, if the delay is
On the other hand, the Supreme Court
tinuance to effectively represent the defendant, the speedy trial period may be not the fault of the defendant, the trial has held that a mere unsupported allegaextended by the operation of CRS § 18-1- court should make every effort to accom- tion that a material witness will be una405(3). A continuance is "chargeable to modate both the speedy trial and effective vailable on the trial date is insufficient to
defendant if it was caused by an affirma- assistance rights of a defendant. In People satisfy the three prongs of CRS § 18-1-405
23
29
In Sweet v. Myers, the Court held
tive act of his, with his express consent, or ex rel. Gallagherv.DistrictCourt, the Col- (6g)I)0
by other affirmative conduct evincing con- orado Supreme Court held that the delay that a mere claim that a witness would be
arising from the replacement of counselunavailable did not amount to a showing
sent."15

case was remanded to the trial court with
directions to dismiss the charge.
For appeal time to be excluded from the
speedy trial calculation, the appeal must
be taken in the pending case. In People v.
Rosidivito,'12 the prosecution, in a separate
action, obtained a trial court order unsealing the defendant's record. The defendant
appealed pursuant to CAR. 21. The Colorado Court of Appeals held that the delay
caused by the defendant's C.A.R. 21 appeal should not be added to the period in
which he must be brought to trial. The
court concluded that the defendant's right
to appeal in the separate case cannot be
conditioned on his waiver of1speedy
trial
3
in the pending criminal case.
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of due diligence by the prosecution to obtain the presence of the witness on the
scheduled trial date, particularly because
there was no evidence that the witness
30
would be available at a later trial date.
Actions of the prosecution, other than
formal requests for a continuance, also
may cause delays that are attributable to
the prosecution. For example, when the
prosecution fails to comply with discovery
requirements in a timely fashion, the delay resulting from the defendant's request
for a continuance to evaluate the new information has been charged to the prosecution, not to the defendant.31 Even in this
situation, appellate courts consider other
factors, such as the defendant's objection
to any speedy trial waiver and the availtrial dates within the speedy
ability of new
32
trial period.

The prosecution cannot indiscriminately dismiss and re-file charges to avoid the
mandate of the speedy trial statute." However, if the prosecution re-files as a result
of a change in circumstances that justifies
the re-filing, the speedy trial calculation
may start anew.34 Dismissal and re-filing
to comply with compulsoryjoinder requirements has been deemed a legitimate excuse. 35 The motive of the prosecutiongood or bad faith-is a relevant consideration in these circumstances.' 6

Miscellaneous Delays
And Other Issues
CRS § 18-1-405 provides for the exclusion of certain other periods of time from
the calculation of the speedy trial time period. In the event of a mistrial, the statutory speedy trial period is extended for a
reasonable period of delay, not to exceed37
three months, caused by each mistrial.
A delay of two months in scheduling the
retrial has been deemed reasonable when
the new trial date was the first available
date on the court's docket. 38 A retrial-after a mistrial-that occurs more than three
months after the mistrial, but still within
the original six-month speedy trial period,
to comply with the speedy
has been held
39
trial statute.

CRS § 18-1-405(6)(i) provides that the
time between the filing of a motion for
change of venue and the ruling on that
motion shall be excluded from the speedy
trial time calculation. This subsection overruled pre-existing case law.4° If the motion
for change of venue is granted, the time
between the granting of the motion and
the first appearance in the appropriate
court also is excluded. Additionally, if the

Criminal Law Newsletter
change of venue occurs after a trial date
has already been set in the original venue, the court in the new venue has an additional three months from the first appearance of all parties within which to conduct the trial.

41

By statute, the following are to be excluded from the calculation of the speedy
trial period: (1) the period during which a
defendant is incompetent to stand trial;
(2) the period during which a defendant is
being evaluated on the question of compe-

tency or sanity; and (3) the period during
which a defendant "is unable to appear by
"42
reason of illness or physical disability
The speedy trial time period is not to include any reasonable period of delay due
to the joinder for trial of a co-defendant. 43
There are two limitations on this extension of the speedy trial time. First, the codefendant's time for trial must not have
run; and second, there must be good cause
to deny a request for a severance of the defendants.44
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The delay caused by the recusal of the
original trial judge ordinarily does not justify extending the statutory speedy trial
time period. In People v.Arledge,45 the defendant's original motion to recuse the trial court was denied. Just before trial, the
defendant supplemented the record and
the trial court recused itself The trial court
then obtained a speedy trial waiver over
the objection of defense counsel. The case
was re-assigned and set for a date outside
the original speedy trial time period, again
over the objection of the defendant. The
Colorado Supreme Court held that: (1) no
part of the delay was attributable to the
defendant; (2) the original trial court was
without authority to obtain a waiver once
it had recused itself; and (3) the prosecution or court had a duty to find a trialjudge
who could hear the matter in a timely
fashion, including seeking the appointment of a senior judge.
The Colorado Supreme Court has indicated its disapproval of certain other procedures employed by trial courts that have
the effect of extending the statutory speedy
trial time limit. In People v. Chavez,4 the
Court expressly disapproved the practice
of the trial judge in postponing arraignment until all pretrial matters had been
47
concluded. Similarly, in Barela v. People,
the Court disapproved the trial court's
practice of empaneling a jury, then conducting motions hearings, then swearing
in the jury.In Barela,the prosecution took
an interlocutory appeal alter the last-minute motions hearing. The Court held that
this procedure undermined the general
scheme established by the Rules of Criminal Procedure ("C.R.Crim.P.") for resolving motions. 48 In neither Chavez nor Barela did the Court expressly hold that the
trial court's procedures either did, or did
not, justify an extension of the statutory
speedy trial time period. However, the disapproval of these procedures suggests that
the Court is not likely to view them as viable justifications for an extension of the
statutory speedy trial period.
One source of occasional confusion is
the effect bail has on the calculation of the
statutory speedy trial time period. Simply
granting bail to a defendant does not affect the statutory right to a speedy trial,
even when the defendant posts a bond and
is released. 49 If a defendant's bond is re-

voked and increased due to the commis-
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